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SOME ASPECTS OF THE

BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH FOREIGN AID

October, 1969

DP 77

Discnchantm2n-t with fo:r'c:dgn aid is' shar-0c1 by both cfono:i."' wnd 1°ecipfont
1
comrt;,:•ies.

The purpose of this pape:r.• is to e,tplo1 e sorns: cif the sotn::•ces
1

of this mood in the case of one la1:'ge c.ou1Yt1'.'y n Brazil~ which dtu'ing 19Glf,~67
>.,c,.nked only behind India~ Pakistan and South Vietnam as a J'.'ecipient o:I:
Y>t:,t

■=

,:,;.•
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•. • ~ •'"10,,p_·,
0IXic_a_
~- nDo· l

No attempt will be made to cover all aspects of the Bl:>crnilia.,! fm. eign..
0

aid e}tpel"ience; discussion will center on topics which have received
relatively little emphasis in the aid literature.

These include difficulties

imposed by the initial conditions on the achievement of la:r•ge r•eal tz•,':l.nsfm:·s ~
the disconti.nui ty of aid and its frequent changes of ohjecti v0s .Ii dislim-.,s.-::::m::•nt
lags and the relevance of Brazilian experience to the progr,,am wn"sus
pl"oj 0.ct deb ate.
Brazil has relied on foreign sou1•ces during most post wa:t' years to
finance cun°ent account deficits in its Ba.lance of Payments.

'I'he alge-

braic sum of those deficits fl•orn 1950 through 1960 ):'eached $2. 8 Billion;
the corz'esponding figure :for 1961 th1"ough .1.968 was $1. 5 Billion~

Exto:rtnal

Hnanc:i.ng has taken many forms, many of which cannot be labelle.d a.id.

the Brazi.l:i.Rn -="•...,.,~-=·~.-.:r......-.,,-.·~--~=<>
bi:t1ance o:f payments.

~ • - ~ - - - . , . . __. .....=.,.

Be:fm?O 1961 ~ rriarld.ng the birth of the Alliance fo::t~ Prog2:•2rrn ~ Brazil

rel:i.,(;!d fo;;, its enternal financing mainly on p1"iva'tfi sources

:1

including

supplic1·s I c1"-c:dits t and on bilate1~a1 and mu.ltil..r tex'al public lnstitutioas
lendirig at near connne1°cia.l r-ates,. such as the U.S. E,:por•t<Cmpo:r.t Bank
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(IBRD).

Pre-1961 experience left a legacy of financial commitments which

had a marked influence on the post-1961 years, when aid became a more
important element in external financing.

A closer look at the pre-1961

capital account is therefore Warranted.
A summary of the Brazilian balance of payments during the 1950 1 s
is presented in Table 1.

The net capital inflow represented during those

years 17 per cent of merchandise imports and more than 5 per cent of gross
fixed investment.

Tha average figUiles hi.de oonsideroa.hle fluctuations .in

the net capital inflow; cut'I'ent account deficits larger than $450 Million
were registered in 1951, 1952 and 1960, while 1950, 1953 and 1956 witnessed
current account surpluses.
Net direct investments, going mainly into the rapidly expanding
manufacturing sector, accounted for a substantial share of the capital
·2

inflow,

More remarkably, short term borrowing by the public and private

sectors was roughly as important as direct investments as a source of
finance.

Large commercial debts, including important ones with oil

suppliers, were run up, especially toward the end of the decade.

The

EXIMBANK and the IBRD were the major external public lenders to Brazil
before 1961.

The former authorized long term loans for more than $900

Million, while the latter's gross lending to Brazil reached $267 Million.

3

Other medium and long term capital comes from suppliers' credits, many of
which involved high financial charges.
Interest payments on these debts became stiff; factor payments abroad.
excluding those on direct investments, rose from an annual average of
$23 Million during 1950-52 to 099 Million during 1958•60,

Amortization

obligations also rose, and it became clear toward the end of the decade

Table 1

Current Account
Expm:-ts i f, o,b.
Imports i G. i. f.
Nc,;t non••fin.::ncial services and privc,te transfe1 s.
Net incornr, payments on direct investments
OthE::C net fa.ct01~ payments abroad
~~~tc~2x~5: t<:.J; 17: t;t.?~

$J.l>LJ-30
•~l ~.ti-80
65

1

79
60

_,$·

isi+'

$

5
.106

Capital Account

P'tib~n·c='tr•~;·;:~;;;-ferc;
Net direct investments
Net short term capital 1 including

~~~ggi~sili~ 8 net

short

97
7'7

Medi um and long term capital t net
· Loan drawings
($260)
/unortii.2;;ati ons
(=183)

•
•
E :r.:eo1.~s an d. Om1.ss1.ons

Sources:

rn

30

Basic data obtained fporn International. t'Jonntary -Fund~ Balance
of Paynkmts Ye,:rC'book ( severa.1 issues).

a~crc➔bf-t":=m~'="-~~,~'='•T·:=,~=

Negative sJgn

_irnr;-fi.es
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that Brazil faced a serious foreign debt crisis.

Debt service charges,

including amortizations on medium and long term debt plus interest on all
debt, rose from 13 per cent of merchandise exports in 1955, to an unusual
44 per cent in 1960.
The Alliance for Progress in Brazil, then, opened under peculiar
conditions.

Thanks in part to the net capital inflow, the country had

been able to achieve from 1947 through 1960 an annual growth rate in its
real Gross Domestic Product of about 6 per cent, with industry expanding
at more than 9 per cent per annum.

This was accomplished even though the

1955-59 volume of all merchandise exports was 16 per cent below that of
1948-49.

But by 1961 the Brazilian external debt (including undisbUI'sed)

had surpassed $3 Billion.

4

External Financing during the Alliance for Prozyess years; An overall view.
A summary comparison of post-Alliance Brazilian performance with
that of the 1950's is at first blush somewhat disconcerting.

It is not

just that overall growth dropped from around 6 to less than 4 per cent
per annum; more puzzling at first sight is the decline in the net capital
inflow, as shown in Table 2, at a time when foreign aid was becoming more
plentiful.
Some forms of aid did become more plentiful to Brazil after 1961.
As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).
and the newly created Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), lent
substantial sums to that country after 1961, and the U.S. Food for Freedom
program and the World Bank group increased the level of their grants and
loans.

-5-

When the 1960's are compared as a whole with the 19SO's, using
aggregate balance of payments statistics, the main accomplishment of this
increase in development loans and grants appears to be a tidying up of the
Brazilian foreign debt.

The short term commercial debts and supplieI'S'

credits piled up during the 19SO's were either paid up or refinanced under
better conditions, with the help of U.S. and multilateral lending institutions.
A good share of the time of Brazilian economic authorities during the early
1960 1 s was spent on short term debt management, or, in the phrase favored
by financial writers, in keeping the country from "going bankrupt".

Major agreements with a group of creditors (The Hague Club) on debt re
schedulings were reached on May 1961 and July 1964.

On both occasions

creditors chose to keep Brazil on a "short leash", and the reschedulings
served only as stop-gap measures.

5

But by 1967 the structure of the

Brazilian foreign debt was much healthier than that of 1960; average
conditions on interest rates, grace periods and amortization schedules were
softer.

The participation of suppliers' credits in total debt had

decreased and short term commercial debts were being met regularly, the
arrears having been liquidated.

Debt service payments, in absolute amounts.

were in 1967 no greater than what they had been in 1960; coupled with
an expansion of merchandise exports, the debt service ratio was reduced
to 34 per cent in 1967.
All of this is pleasing.

But one may wonder what would have happened

if AID, IBRD and IADB loans had not been available in the amounts indicated
in Table 3

0

One possibility is that Brazil would have had to "tighten its

belt" further during the 1960' s, to meet its foreign debt obligations•
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Table 2
Brazilian Balance of Payments, 1961 through 1967
(Annual averages, Million current dollars)
Current Account
Exports I f.o,b,
Imports, c.i.f.
Net non-finan cial services and private transfers
Net income payments on direct investmen ts
Other net factor payments abroad
Net Capital Inflow

$1,492
-1.360
•
-

57
88
134

$.. 147

Capital Account
Public Transfers
Net direct investmen ts
Net short term capital including changes in net short
term assets
Medium and long term capital, net
( $511)
Loan drawings
(-413)
Amortizat ions
E?'X'ors and Omissions

Sources:

As in Table l

25

$

131

•

.

63
98
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Table 3
New Loans and Grants to Brazil Authorized by Major Dono:ris
(Annual averages; Million current dollars)

u.s.

Fiscal Years

1946 through 1960

U.S. AID and predecessor agencies
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

Food fo~ Freedom and predecessor programs
EXIMBANK long term loans
Other Economic Programs
Military Assistance

World Bank Group
Inter-Ame~ican Development Bank
Total

Source:

$ 3.1

10.5
64.6
3.0
8.3
18.5

u.s.

Fiscal Years
1961 through 1967
$148.8
75.5
34.7
3,0

20.9
35.8
64.9
$383,5

Agency for International Development, u.s. Overseas Loans and Grants
and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, n.c.:
•
1968J, pp. 33 and !'61.
"World Bank Group" refers to IBRD and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC). Inter-American Development Bank loans include
those of the Social Progress Trust Fund. EXIMBANK loans
exclude $397.2 Million of refunding loans made by that institution
to Brazil during 1961-65.
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Argentina, after all, from 1963 through 1967 registered current account
surpluses adding to $930 Million, under pressure of external debt obligations.
It could thus be argued that the increase in external official inflows shown
in Table 3 made possible a larger current account deficit, or a smaller
surplus, than would have taken place in the absence of official assistance.
The fact that such a deficit was during the 1960's smaller on the average
than that registered in the 1950 1 s could then be considered irrelevant.
In other words, a country can be receiving aid, defined as grant and loans
under concessionary terms not available to it from commercial markets,
6
.
.
.
'
'h out necessarily
However, unde~
current account de f"icits.
registering
wit

Brazilian political conditions (of which more later), the realistic
alternatives to an increase in external official inflows were either a
unilateral moratorium on debt servicing, or more debt rescheduling.

The

prestige and credit standing Brazil preserved in world financial circles
by avoiding those alternatives can be credited to the availability of
external official flows.

To most Brazilians this is probably not a very

exciting contribution of foreign aid.
From the Brazilian viewpoint, the desirability of the finanoial
juggling accomplished during the 1960 1 s partly depends on the legitimacy
of the old debts, and the economic and other conditions attached to new
gross inflows.

Little solid information exists on the suppliers' credits

and commercial arrears accumulated during the l950's; the usual stories
of high pressure selling with hints of corruption are heard.

More funda

mentally, one may question the desirability of mechanisms used in industri
alized cotmtries first to promote their exports of capital and other goods

-9-

by liberal use of official insurance and credit schemes, and then to pressure
recipient countries to consolidate private bad debts thus generated into
public debt.

On both the exporting and importing sides, this system reduces

entrepreneuria l incentives to refine cost-benefit calculations and objectively
7
The major responsibility for screening which
evaluate commercial r!sks.
suppliers' credit are accepted for official repayments guarantees naturally
rests with the receiving country.

But industrialized countries which

officially encourage their exporters to aggressively push their wares are
not without responsibility when the time comes to consider bad debts.
The terms of the official flows going into Brazil during the 1960 1 s
were on the whole more favorable, at least regarding maturities, grace
periods and interest rates, then those of external credits received during
the 1950' s.

But at an aggregate level, it may be noted that the "tying"

characterizing U.S. flows reduced their contribution to Brazilian debt
management.

Debt servicing is of course untied, and must be finance from

the general pool of foreign exchange.

While imports financed with tied

aid presumably~ .foreign exchange for debt servicing, the substitution
is not perfect, especially in the short run, and further taxes the accounting
and financial ingenuity of economic authorities, diverting them from
considering long term development problems.
To summarize:

During the Alliance years Brazil received substantially

larger official inflows, or aid, but because of unfavorable initial conditions
and Brazilian policy choices on how to deal with them, such inflows resulted
in a lower transfer of real resources than had been accomplished during
the 1950's.

The net capital inflow from 1961 through 1967 amounted to
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about 11 per cent of merctandise imports and to less than 5 per cent of
gross fixed investment.

In per capita terms, or as a percentage of

Gross National Product, its contribution seems even smaller.

8

The Continuity and Objectives of Foreign Aid
Treating post-1960 years as a whole misses much of the difficulties
surrounding foreign aid to Brazil.

The major problem has been the

political and economic unstability experienced by that country during the
1960 1 s.

Decisions by both bilateral and multilateral donors have been

taken with the political and economic short run very much in mind.
After less than one year in office, President Quadros resigned in
August 1961.

Vice-President Goulart succeeded him, but under military

pressure, a parlamentarian-type government was adopted, reducing the powers
of the Presidency.

On January 1963 a plebiscite confirmed, by a wide

margin, a return to a full presidentialist regime.
President Goulart was overthrown.

On April 1964,

Although since then the military have

been in effective command of the government, several political crises
have erupted, the most severe in December 1968.

Economic policy emphasized

stabilization during April 1964 to April 1967 (the term of President
Castello Branco), and expansion since then.
Before April 1964 U.S. aid programs followed a zigzagging course.
buffetted by Brazilian political changes, and hoping in turn to influence
them.

The stop-go decisions of those years make dizzying reading.

In

May 1961, AID agreed to lend Brazil $100 Million in balance of payments
assistance, as part of a package including the IMF, European creditors,
EXIMBANK and the U.S. Treasury.

The loan was suspended with Quadros'
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resignation.

Later on, however, AID agreed to release $75 Million from

that loan between November 1961 and April 1962.

Disenchantment with Goulart

led to a new temporary suspension of ~urther disbursements, but the
Bell-Dantas agreement of April 1963 led to the disbursement of the remaining
$25 Million.

Shortly after that date, AID gave up hope on the Goulart

regime, and adopted an "islands of sanity" strategy, calling for cooperation
with selected state governments (Brazil being a federal republic), autonomous
public agencies, and private sector "to the extent that this was possible".
Answering criticisms of the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) regarding
project loans made before April 1964, U.S. AID admitted that " ••• overriding

u.s.

policy considerations ••• 11 and not just developmental criteria weighed

.
decision-ma
• .
k"ing. 9
h eav1·1yon its

The point was forcefully, although with some factual inaccuracies,
expressed by Mr. Thomas C. Mann, then Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, testifying in Congress in May 1964:

We were aware in January by the time I got
there--! do not know how much earlier--that
the erosion toward communism in Brazil was very
rapid. We had, even before I got here, devised
policy to help certain state. governments. We
did not give any money in balance of payments
support, budgetary support, things of that kind,
which benefit directly the Central Government
of Brazil. That was cut back under Goulart.
In my opinion, sir, and I think this is the
opinion of many people who are informed about
Brazil, the fact that we did put our limited
amount of aid in the last year of the Goulart
administration into states which were headed
by good governers we think strengthened
democracy. 11 10
11

Since April 1964, U.S. aid to Brazil became steadier and greater
attention was given to economic~ rather than political criteria.

Most of
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the program, however, was aimed at supporting short term stabilizatio n
measures.

Talking early in 1969 about

u.s.

AID programs in Brazil, Chile

and Colombia, Mr. James R. Fowler, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance
for Progress, stated:
" On looking back, as I have recently, over the
years of the Alliance in these major three countries,
it seems very clear to me that conscious decisions
were made that the resource input and the assistance
in the first instance would go to try to bring some
stability into these economies. 11 11
The emphasis on inflation control was particularl y strong in Brazil,
where the cost of living rose by 89 per cent between the second quarters
of 1963 and 1964.

The major innovation in AID Brazilian activities,

the program loan, became the key lever for supervising Brazilian use
of its monetary and fiscal instruments .

Between 1964 and 1968 finds

from program loans were released only subject to quarterly reviews of
Brazilian policy performance which AID judged satisfactor y.

After the

April 1967 change in Brazilian administrat ion, disbursemen ts from program
loans were in fact held up from July until the end of that year, due
to disagreemen ts between AID and the new Finance Minister on economic
matters, showing that the quarterly reviews were no mere formality.
Political considerati ons, somewhat different from pre-1964 ones,
again interfered with the continuity of U.S. aid flows late in 1968.
After the Brazilian military brushed aside on December 1968 some of the
flimsy post-1964 constitutio nal legality, AID placed "under review"
further disbursemen ts from its last program loan (signed in May 1968),
as well as project and sector loans which had previously been authorized,

-13but not signed.

Disbursements from project and sector loans already

signed, however, went ahead.
Discontinuity in lending operations to Brazil has not been the monopoly
of AID.

As shown in Table 3, the EXIMBANK sharply curtailed its gross

lending to Brazil during the Alliance years.
a,:,e not clear.

The reasons for this behavior

During the early 1960' s the EXIMBANK apparently felt

that too much of its portfolio was being taken up by this risky borrower.
Later on, perhaps because of bureaucratic rivalries, it failed to coordinate
its program with that of AID.

The World Bank Group also followed a stop-

go policy in its Brazilian operations; from 1960 through 1964 it did
not authorize a single loan to Brazil.

This was followed by authorizations

of loans amounting to a total of $251 Million from 1965 through 1967.
The record of the IADB has been steadier; from 1961 through 1964 it
authorized loans to Brazil averaging $56 Million a year, increasing to
$101 Million a year from 1965 through 1967.

Authorizations on the Food

for Freedom program were often erratic, as in 1967, raising serious doubts
in Brazilian minds as to their reliability.
The stop-go authorization policies of the EXIMBANK and the IBRD
yielded an ironic result.

During 1961-63, when Brazilian economic policy

wa.s presumably at its worst, net disbursements (gross disbursements to
Brazil minus Brazilian amortizations) amounted to a total of $208 Million
for the EXIMBANK and $26 Million for the IBRD.

During 1964-67, when

major efforts were made to stabilize the Brazilian economy, net disburse
ments from both institutions were negative, reaching -$119 Million for
the EXIMBANK and -$30 Million for the IBRD. 12 The withdrawal of these
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institutions from the Brazilian scene during the early 1960's, further
more, hampered rapid and efficient identification and execution of new
projects after 1964.

The variable lag of disbursements behind loan

authorizations , especially important at a time when the aid pipeline
was being built up, as it was in the early Alliance years, thus compounded
13
the instability and unpredictabilit y of actual aid receipts.
Whether or not the political and economic judgements which gave
foreign aid to Brazil during the 1960's its unstable and short run character
were correct, it is reasonably clear that by so doing it sacrificed the
contribution foreign aid can make to sensible long range planning, not
to mention the more ambitious social reform targets also contained in
the Charter of Punta del Eate.
Loan Authorizations and Disbursements:
A look at time profiles and implications for the grant-element.
Standard calculations of the grant element in development loans
implicitly assume that they are fully disbursed at the time the loan
agreement is signed, or that repayment schedules begin to apply only
14 However, while disbursements will
after the funds are disbursed.
in fact be spread out over several years, loan agreements typically specify
that repayments of principal will begin x number of years (about 5 years
for IADB and IBRD loans and 10 years for AID loans) after their signing,
or at best after the first disbursements, regardless of the pace of
disbursements.

Although interest is charges only on the disbursed amounts,

loans made by the IADB and the IBRD carry a "commitment charge", often
of three-fourths of one per cent per annum, to be paid on the undisbursed

-15-

amount of the loan.
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Both the disbursement lag and the "commitment charge" reduce the
grant element of loans below what is estimated in standard calculations
by an amount to be determined in this section.
In what follows attention will be centered on the grace period,
assuming that loans are fully disbursed within that time.

No change in

the standard calculations for the post-grace period is necessary.
Assume for simplicity that a loan is disbursed in equal parts
Use the following notation:

throughout the grace period.

L face value of the loan
q

rate of discount

G grace period (number of years)
t

time

The present discounted value of the disbursements at the time of
signing will be:
G L e-qtdt = L (1-e-qG)
1 o G

Gq

The value of (1) is naturally lower than that of L.

(1)

Assuming,

G = 5 years
q = 10 per cent
Then the value of (1) will only be 79 per cent of L.

In other

words, this factor alone reduces the grant element of a loan by 21 per
centage points.
There is some offset to this by the fact that during the grace period
interest will not be paid on the whole face value of the loan, but only

-16-

on its undisbursed amount.

On

the other hand, the penalty charge on

the undisbursed balance will chip away at that offset.
The present value of interest payments during the grace period
under the new assumption regarding loan disbursemen ts will be:
G Lite-qt dt

I

o.G

(2)

Where in addition to previous notation:
i = interest rate on the loan
The present value of the penalty charges on the undisbursed amounts
during the grace period will be·:

G Z(L-Lt) e-qt dt
I

G

O

( 3)

Where the new symbol, Z, refers to the penalty charge.
Combining (2) and (3) one gets:
G

[ (i-z) Lt+ ZL] e-qt dt

I
0

G

(4)

This expression may be compared with the standard estimate of the
present value of interest payments during the grace period:

(5)

If penalty charges were to reach interest rates the two expressions
would be identical,

Solving (4) one obtains:

-17Which can be compared to the solution for (5):

(7)

So long as Z is smaller than i, the value of (6) will be smaller
than ( 7) , thus "putting back" some of the grant element taken away in
equation ( l).
Assume,
i = 5 per cent
Z = three-fourths of one per cent
and other parameters as above, then expression (6) will become
O.l06L.

Expression (7) becomes 0.197L~

-

. In the nume~ical example given, then, the net effect of the new
assumptions, as compared with the standard ones assuming instant dis
bursements and no penalty charges, is to reduce the grant element by
about twelve additional percentage points.

In other words, if using

standard assumptions the grant element of a loan was 75 per cent, under
16
the modified assumptions the grant element will be 63 per cent.
Table 4 summarizes the disbursement rates of project loans made
to Brazil by the IADB (57 loans), IBRD (16 loans) and AID (39 loans),
No institution had disbursed, on the average, more than 50 per cent
of the principal of its loans two and a half years after the signing
of the loan agreements.

17

About eighty per cent or more of the principal

became disbursed only after four and a half years following the loan
agreement.

These lags are to some extent inevitable:

equipment has

to be ordered, projects will run i~to unexpected technical snags, receiving
countries may fail to put up their share of the funds at the required

-18-

time, etc.

Bureaucratic delays by both recipients and donors, often

complicated by policy disagreements, also add to disbursement delays.
But regardless of their justification, it is clear that this type of
development loan does not provide cash on hand like a bond sale does.
A more realistic example of grant element calculations, with and
without the wrinkle developed in this section, can be given taking into
account Table 4.

Assume an IBRD/IADB type of loan, with an interest

rate of 5 per cent per annum, and a 5 year grace period followed by 20
years of amortization of the principal in equal amounts.

Using a discount

rate of 10 per cent per annum, the grant element of that loan, using
standard procedures, would be about 35 per cent.

When a "commitment

charge" of three quarters of one per cent, and disbursements of 10, 20,
30

and 40 per cent of the loan for the first, second, third and fourth

years following its signature are taken into account in the calculation,
leaving other assumptions unchanged, the grant element drops by about
half to 18 per cent.
The

18

experience with program loans and ether aid practices

Not all loans to Brazil share the slow disbursement rates indicated
in Table 4.

AID program loans, in particular, have been disbursed more

quickly (typically within two years), especially when no policy dis
agreements arose between the Brazilian and the

u.s.

governments.

This

section will discuss other characteristics of U.S. program loans to Brazil,
as well as the newer concept of sector loans, and other features of
project loans.
For many yeal."s ec'On.0.mists.. p.raised,~e• advantc3i~es of prog~m over

project loans, especially in the context of development planning.

More

-19-

Table 4
Average Visb'UI'sement Profiles of Project Loans to Brazil
(As Cumulated Percentages of Loan Principals)
IADB

IBRD

AID

Disb'UI'sements by December 31 of:
Year of signature of loan agreement
First full calendar year after agreement
Second full calendar year after agreement
Third full calendar year after agreement
Fourth full calendar year after agreement
Fifth full calendar year after agreement
Sixth full calendar year after agreement
Seventh full calendar year after agreement
Sources and Method:

6

21
50
70
81
88

94
100

l
9
37
63
88

96
99
99

7
24
49

76
80
90
100
100

For the IADB, the calculation includes loans made from

Ordinary Resources, Special Operations and Social Trust Fund from 1961
Basic data obtained from the Annual Reports of that institution
(Statements of Approved Loans). IBRD loans include those made during
1958 and 1959, plus those granted from 1965 through 1968. The averages

through 1968.

shown for this institution, therefore, are probably less representative than
those for the IADB and AID. (IBRD loans made during 1958-59 were disbursed
rapidly, while 1965-68 loans have had very slow disbursement rates.) Basic
IBRD data obtained from its Monthly Statement of Loans, December issues,
Mimeographed. Calculations for AID include only project loans made from
1962 through 1968; basic data obtained from AID, Office of the Controller.
Status of Loan Agreements, December issues.

-20recently, and reflecting Latin American experience, program lending has
19
. . .
l
.
come under pro f essiona criticism.

It will be argued.in this section

that Brazilian experience with AID program loans sheds not much light
on the project vs program debate,

The reason is that AID program

loans to Brazil have little in common, except their label, to the program
loans economists had in mind.
From 1961 through 1968, program-type AID loans to Brazil worth $625
Million were authorized and signed, of which $100 Million were granted
before April, 1964.

Those loans, however, given as general balance of

payments support in the midst of difficult political conditions, generated
much U.S. Congressional opposition to this aid form.

Their major objectives·

appear to have been political, rather than economic.

Partly to persuade

the U,S. Congress that finds would not be wasted, post-1964 program
loans were accompanied by a system of quarterly review, to which reference
has been made earlier.

Latin American program loans took on a character

different from those made to the more "reliable" India.

Those reviews,

replaced since 1968 by semi-annual sessions, often involved as many as
thirty people on each the U.S. and the Brazilian side, and went into

many detailed aspects of Brazilian economic policy, even though AID had
other ways of obtaining desired information,

Many Brazilian officials

found them not only humiliating, but also counterproducti ve.

20

They

created an atmosphere encouraging rationalization s and double-talk,
not very conducive to frank discussions of aid and development policies.
The reviews concentrated on monetary and fiscal instruments, including
exchange rate policy, rather than on targets, in a fashion not unlike
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that of the Inte1~n2tic:aal Monetary Fund (IMF), To many, in fact, AID
program loa.ns differed from IMF stand-by agreements only in the much
more generous financial conditions involved in the former, with the off
setting cost that the latter involve review sessions only once a year,
and with officials who stay in the counti~y just a few days,

Instead

of the yea:rily "letters of intention" requiried by the IMF stand-by,
Brazilian letters to the Ch&i:i."man of the Inter-American Committee for
the Alliance for Progress, with detailed quantitative targets in the
fields of credit and fiscal policy, accompanied the AID program loans,
In other words, instead of committing program loans to support a five
year development plan, AID used one year pledges to back one-year financial
and fiscal policy packages.

To paraphrase Hirschman-Bird, AID program

loans attempted to reward vi:r•tue of a very particular and fragile species.
Under pressure fa•om the U.S. Treasury Department, and much to the
annoyance of AID,

17

additionality" requirements, aimed at going beyond

standard tying porcedures and assuring that program loan dollars would
be spent on ~~ditional Brazilian imports from the U.S., further complicated
progr•am J.02.n reviews.

Paradoxically, at a time when the U.S. was promoting

the liberalization o:f the Brazilian import and exchange control system,
special regulations had to be introduced by Brazil to encourage the
divorsio:·1 of import demand toward U.S. sources.

These regulations went

against the spirit, if not the letter, of post war agreements against
trade discriminations.

For example, six months credits at low rates of

inte~est (negative in real terms) were granted to importers of certain
narrowly specified goods, which happened to be available only in the U.S.
Since the adoption of a fJ.c:dble exchange rate, which is depreciated in
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small but frequent doses by the Central Bank, importers of "allowable"
U.S. goods were promised that they could pay for those imports at the

going spot exchange rate, even though imports were not likely to materialize
in six or more months.

Other impor>ters, of course, would have to pay

a premium on forward dollars to cover themselves against exchange risks.
"Allowable" imports from the U.S. we:r:ie :r:iegulated until 1968 by an
extensive negative list, naturally including, besides luxury goods,
commodities for which the U.S. already enjoyed a lar>ge share of the
Brazilian market.

In 1968 the system was tightened by the change to a

positive list of allowed imports, increasing the time devoted by Brazilian
and AID officials to wrestling with U.S. T:r:ieasu:r:iy officials over which
goods could or> could not be impor>ted.

A good day in aid administration

became one when AID could convince the Treasury that usual Brazilian
impor>ts from Chile should be left out of the positive list.

•~Additionality"

was finally abolished in June, 1969.
It appear>s that the implementation of "additionality" caused in
Brazil less problems than it did in Chile and Colombia.
to importer>s of

u.s.

Incentives

goods were so strong that funds moved quickly, unlike

Chile, where program loans funds have gone unspent on several occasions.
For whatever reasons, which may include the Brazilian import liberalization
program and its impact on imports of durable consumer goods, the U.S.
share in total Brazilian imports rose from 32.3 per cent during 1961-65
to 36.7 per cent in 1966-67.

Detailed data are not yet available to

ju.dge the extent to which this was the result of trade diversion induced
by tying and additionality.

But one real cost of "additionali ty", perhaps

·-23-

its greatest~ is clear:

it used up an inordinate share of the time of

both Br2zilian and U.S. officials denling with aid, and reduced the
credibility of AID officials arguing that the funds were given to promote
Brazilian development.

This is a far cry from the ideal program loan

economists c-::,::-:,..::~ast with project lending.
Defenders of the AID program loans argue that) given the mood of
the U.S. Congress, only short term commitments keyed to anti-inflationary
efforts, and surrounded by the paraphenalia of rigorous quarterly reviews,
were politically feasible if aid to Brazil was to be raised quickly after
April, 1964.

It is further argued, somewhat paternalistically, that

the review mechanisms have helped Brazilian planning (at least of a short
term rn~asure), by forcing that government to marshall its data and thoughts
regula!'ly, and by providing a platform for expert fo:r:,eign counselling.
Although the alleged goal of these loans is not to force conditions on
an unwilling government, but to strengthen the hand of the "good guys"
within that government who without prodding agree with AID presc:r:,iptions,
it is cc:'.1.sicer•ed that the "good guys" can benefit from the discipline
of

frequJ;:it 1•eviews and~ depending on the political climate, with the

chance to blame foreigners for the need to take unpopular policy measures.
Hirschman and Bird have pointed out the difficulties in these 2,rguments,
difficulties which~ it may be added, become more serious when the policy
debate tGkes place in a bilateral framework and deals with short run
policies which are easily reversable.
There is polite disagreement between AID and Brazilian officials
rega:r:,ding the impact of post-April 1964 program loans on Brazilian economic
policy m2.kfrg ~ especially during the first three years.

Having sold

-24program loans to Congress at least partly on the basis of the "leverage"
they give over short run macroeconomic policies, AID naturally likes to
hint, with great discretion, that the loans gave the ''good guys" the
critical margin to push through their policies.

Brazilian left-wing

critics of aid, of course, agree with this evaluation, which they express
in a somewhat less polite language.

The "good guys", in the Brazilian

case an impressive group of economists, although grateful for the additional
funds, usually claim the policies would have been the same without them.
As far as an outsider can judge these subtle matters, the latter appear

to have the better case, at least for 1964-67.

In more recent years,

the mechanisms of program lending may have played a more important role
in strengthening the hands of those within the government wishing to
maintain the momentum of the stabilization plan and to adopt a more
21
.
Flexibility in the granting and speed
flexib le exchange rate po l icy.
in the disbursement of AID program loans to Brazil have been their most
impressive features, which are consistent with their stabilization goals.
In the early stages of the anti-inflationary program, as that adopted
in Brazil after April 1964, those features can be particularly important
in mitigating the harshness of the impact of austerity measures.
of their potential advantages, however, were wasted.

Much

During 1964 through

1966, Brazil accumulated a current account surplus of $230 Million dollars,
while projections made during 1964 had expected substantial current account
deficits of $300 and $400 Million were forecasted; in fact, 1965 registered
a surplus of $250 Million and 1966 a deficit of $70 Million.

The major

surprise was the low level of merchandise imports, in turn reflecting an
unexpected contraction in the levels of investment and general economic
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As U.S. officials , worried about the U. S" .bal2.nce of payments,

watched nervously , the assets of Brazilian monetary authoriti es, rather
than Brazilian imports, rose steadily from $170 Million at the end of
the second quarter of 1964 to $505 Million at the end of 1965.

To

avoid this embarrass ing surge in reserves, plans to arrange for new debt

reschedul ing meetings in 1966 were abandoned , and substanti al debt
23
Tied AID program loans were substitut ed
repayment s were accomplis hed.
for another form of short-term "program lending" having the advantage
of freeing untied foreign exchange, i.e., debt reschedul ing.
of AID program loans as cushion

The role

against the negative short run effects

of stabiliza tion was much less visible.

Per capita real absorptio n

during 1964-66 remained at the levels reached during 1961-63 and~ if
the national accounts are to be believed, the absolute level of real
gross fixed investmen t fell by about 15 per cent between those two periods.
Some urban real wages also fell during 1964-66, but this may have been
limited to the best organized and paid urban workers.
To

summarize :

Brazilian experienc e is more relevant to a discussio n

of· lending for stabiliza tion versus lending for devt"l.cpmsnt ~ or more
precisely , to the establishm ent of prioritie s among short an<l long term
goals, than to the hoary project versus program debate.

2L~

During more recent years AID has given greater attention to long

term developme nt goals, such as improving Brazilian agricultu re and the
education al and health systems.
loans has been found

The macro leverage p:,:,o-;-icled by its program

unsuitabl e to promote sectorial reformsJ and a

new form of lending, sector loans,.has begun to appear.,

25

Authorize d

(but unsigned) loans for secondary education and for the e~~2blish ment
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of a Brazilian national fund f()!t- wat~ end sewerage projects
of this type of lending.

M'6

examples

As the direct import content of these activities

is minimal, sector loans share with program loans the feature of providing
foreign exchange, tied only to purchasing from the U.S.

As Brazil has

already developed a diversified capital goods industry, it may be noted,
external financing of only direct import requirements of machinery and
equipment has become an increasingly unsatisfactory way to transfer real
resources into that country.

In fact, a recent AID loan to finance

U.S. capital goods into Brazil has moved slowly due to the keen competition
(and political pressure) of Brazilian capital goods producers.

In contrast

with program loans sector loans include fewer but more pointed preconditions
of a sectorial, rather than of a macroeconomic character.

In this respect,

they are closer to, say, project loans for electricity which carry as
preconditions changes in public utility rates and the organization of
public electrical enterprises.

It is likely that institutions with ex

perience in project lending, such as the IBRD, will expand more and-more
into sectoral loans in areas like industry, agriculture and education,
by liberalizing their policy on financing domestic costs while insisting
on more general poll cy -0ommi tments •
It is too early to evaluate t~ peirft,rmarice of sector
loans in Brazil.

They do get into more sensitive areas than project

loans (education versus electricity), raising Hirshman-Bird difficulties.
It is already known that negotiations over the secondary education sector
loans have been slow and painful.

They have been further complicated

by the constitutional need to deal in this matter both with several

state governments and with the federal government of Brazil.

Other AID

-27plans to devise sectora l loans for univers ity educatio n aborted for politic al
reasons .

Although it is doubtfu l that this type of loan can succeed in

transfer ring large amounts of resource s and promotin g badly needed insti~
tutiona l changes within a bilater al setting involvin g the U.S. and the
26 ·
it represent s, at l east, an e ffort to use
·
present Brazi·1·ian regime,
aid to support policy changes with substan tial long run implica tions
(i.e., educatio nal reform, which has been badly needed in Brazil for many
years), rather than those which may be easily reversab le (i.e. a few percenta ge
changes in credit exapnsio n or in the exchange rate).
As indicate d earlier , Brazil has received a large number of project
loans from AID, IADB and IBRD during the l960's.

Conspic uously absent

from among donor institut ions is the Interna tional Development Associa tion
(IDA), dispensi ng untied soft loans.

This institut ion has ignored Brazil

as too rich, leading some to facetiou sly recommend a secessio n of the
Brazilia n northea si as a way to increase the inflow of aid.

As in other

countri es, project loans signed during 1961 through 1967 by the IBRD
were predomi nantly for electric ity, while those from AID, and especia lly
27 The geograp hical diversif ication
the IADB, were more diversif ied.
within Brazil of theetwo latter institut ions is also greater than that
of the IBRD, which has concent rated its activiti es in the relative ly
prospero us south.

But more recently the trend is for the portfol io of

these institut ions to become less differen tiated, as the IBRD gets ready to
expand into transpo rt, industry , agricult ure and social sectors , while
the IADB, its Social Trust Fu~d exhauste d, increase s its loans into
traditio nal social overhead fields
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If project loans made during 1961 through 1967 by these institutions
are part of a coordinated development strategy, that strategy is not at
all obvious.

Lack, until very recently, of a Brazilian long range development

plan, and the understandable Brazilian reluctance to have those loans co
ordinated by collusion among foreign institutions (some of which takes
place, anyway) 1 partly account for the
projects by each lender.

~ ~

procedures used to evaluate

Well known tying procedures on AID and many

IADB loans, the impact of which could only by mitigated in part by Brazilian
maneuvering as to where different projects were to be financed, reduced
their economic value and biased investment policies.

U.S. legislation

requiring that at least SO per cent of the tonnage financed by AID loans
be shipped on

u.s.

vessels, for example, caused serious delays during

1964-56 for at least one AID fertilizer loan, as a result of which a crop
year was missed.

Projects involving large direct imports from the

u.s.,

such as capital-intensive highway maintenance, which opened possibilities
of diverting Brazilian imports from Western Europe toward the U.S., tended
to be favored over higher priority projects involving a high share of local
costs.
from the

These biases received their main support, it should be noted,

u.s.

Treasury.

More generally, the fact that until very recently bilateral and
multilateral donors concentrated their project lending on large infrastructure
llllits, biased investment in their favor.

Knowledge that external finance

is more available for certain types of projects is bound to exert an
influence over investment plans, especially bearing in mind the costliness
of project preparation.

Ideally, Brazil should have a plan whose priorities

were established independently of external financing possibilities.

In

-29that case, AID, IADB, IBRD, etc., could pick from the plan whatever projects
and sectors they preferred to finance, each according to its own biases.
But in fact, no such strong planning mechanism exists yet in Brazil, and
the investment pattern ends up reflecting to a large extent lenders' ad hoc
preferences .

If those lenders fancy dams and dislike education loans, .

Brazil will tend to invest in dams and neglect education.
One of the best features of project lending, i.e., the encourageme nt
it gives to sectorial project preparation , financial planning and institution 
building, also tended to perpetuate the traditional alloca~ion of project
loans.

Electricity grew increasingl y attractive as a candidate for loans.,

while less traditional borrowers, such as education and health, had to
wait for major policy changes before they could hope for a share of external
fwids.

Furthermore , th~ institution al strength generated by external

support made it easier for the favored sectors to claim higher shares
of domestic resources.

Donor reluctance to lend to public enterprises

engaged in manufacturi ng and mining has also contributed to investment
biases, (and to occasional political frictions).

In short, administrat ive

ease, short run politics (including at least regional and national
Brazilian politics, plus those within the U.S. government and others
involving internation al agencies), and export promotion consideratio ns
seem at least as important as economic criteria in the explanation of
which Brazilian projects receive external finance.
Concluding Remarks
Although this essay has attempted neither an exhaustive treatment
of foreign aid to Brazil nop an analysis of Brazilian economic conditions
during the 1960's, it may be misleading to finish without indicating some
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of the realizations of post-1964 policies,

A gradual reduction in the

rate of inflation from its 1963-64 levels has been accomplished.

Year

over-year percentage price increases have been as follows:
Wholesale index
excluding coffee

Consummer
Prices

1961

40

38

1962

51

52

1963

75

72

1964

82

87

1965

53

61

1966

41

47

1967

27

30

1968

23

24

Controlling inflation has taken longer than expected; the inflationary
impact of correcting long distorted relative prices, or what has been
dubbed corrective inflation, was underestimated.

Supply responses to

relative price increases were often disappointingly sluggish, while those
to decreases were frequently quick.

Yet since 1964 each year has witnessed

lower inflation, and 1969 appears to continue this gradual trend.

The

creation of a new Central Bank and budgetary and fiscal reforms have
expanded and improved the public sector instruments for seeking macro
economic equilibrium, as well as for expanding public savings,
Other institutional changes, such as the creation of a planning
ministry and a central mortgage or housing bank, have improved the machinery
for long term national and sectorial planning.
Not without some setbacks and waverings, domestic relative prices
have moved closer to reflecting real opportunity costs, making them better
guides for resource allocation.

Changes in poiicies toward foreign exchange;

interest and public utility rates, plus a program of import liberalization
started in 1966 which had helped to rationalize the protectionist system
(although import duties remain high) have contributed to this purpose~
The domestic capital market was encouraged, and it is now perhaps the most
active in Latin America.
Measures to help the northeast, already started before 1964, were
continued and extended.

Indeed, the "aid program" of the Brazilian south

to its north, relying mainly on tax incentives, dwarfs that of the rest
29
of the world to Brazii.
Agricultural and export diversification have been encouraged,

Non•

coffee merchandise exports, which during 1962-63 averaged $615 Million
a year, reached $1,028 Million a year during 1967-68.

Finally, while

the overall growth rate hardly stayed ahead of population expansion through
1963-66, it has risen substantially during 1967-68~

The recovery of

investment during recent years has also been strong~
These, then, are the major accomplishments achieved at respectable
social, political and economic costs.

Those costs have been borne unequally

by different social groups, and masses of Brazilians have received little

tangible irranediate help, or hope of future help, from the economic reforms.
Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen how permanent they will
prove to be.
The role of foreign aid in inducing these reforms and softening
their negative short run impact has been, as discussed earlier, very modest.
But the clearest benefit to Brazil from aid received during the l960's,
i.e., an improvement in its foreign debt situation, facilitates future
Brazilian policies toward external financing which may avoid its p~st
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short comings.

Assuming the continuat ion of vigorous export promoting

policies, and the strengthe ning of its planning mechanism, Brazil should
be able during the 1970's to rely to a much larger extent on internati onal
private capital markets for external financing of either its program or
needs.

The other two large Latin American countries , Argentina and

Mexico, have already started issuing long term bonds in world capital
markets, while several less developed countries have recently obtained
suppliers ' credits (as well as the more desirable buyers' credits)
under condition s which favorably compare with those now available
from internati onal organizat ions, thanks to tough bargainin g and judicious
shopping.

The disbursem ent of these program and project loans are

likely to be faster and involve less political friction than those
given by major aid donors.

Their degree of (ex-ante) tying will also

be smaller, assuming that world capital markets will continue their process
of expansion and liberaliz ation started in the 1950's.
Does this mean a partial retreat from the role for external financing
enviscone d in the Charter of Punta del Este?

It does.

A possible

conclusio n to this review of difficult ies of foreign aid to Brazil would
be to suggest the obvious ways in which it could be improved (put it
on steadier, longer term basis, avoid political meddling and breathing
down the recipien t's neck,.inc rease the role of multilate ral aid 9
eliminate red-tape and tying, etc.).

One could call for a return to the

principle s and the spirit of the Alliance for Progress.

But there is little

reason to think that what worked badly in the 1960's will work much better
in the 1970's.

Large and semi-ind ustrialize d developin g countries , like

Brazil, and industria lized nations with thick capital markets, would
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do well to ponder Professor C. P. Kindleberger's recent words:

~In a world increasingly attracted by decentralizatio n
and local responsibility, the possibility of returning ··
to the impersonal forces of the international capital
market inevitably suggests itself. If the complex
apparatus of intergovernmen tal and governmental aid
and lending is not working satisfactorily, perhaps
the time has come to revive the mechanism which it
replaced. If the second-best machinery is poor,
can we repair the first-best?30
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estimates to not take into account the negative effects of "tying" of
AID and some IADB loans.
Determina tion of the correct discount rate is complicat ed not only by
whether one is trying to measure benefits to r>ecipient s or costs to
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of Inter-American Development, op. cit., p. 599. The use of counterpart
funds generated by program loans is supposed to be the immediate political
lever helping the "good guys 11 • The fact that these funds can be channelled
to the private sector rather easily via credit institutions has also been
used to persuade the U.S. Congress of the advantages of progr·ar.1 in contrast
with project lending, as typically large projects are found rF.·.inly in the
public sector.
22. Merchandise imports, f.o.b., had been forecasted late in 1964 by
the CIAP Secretariat, in consultation with the Brazilian govE,::."'Ilment, to
reach $1,450 Million in 1965 and $1,303 in 1966. Dur:l.ng 1960-63 the
corresponding figures averaged about $1.3 Billion.
23. The debt service during 1964 amounted to about $410 Millian; the
corresponding figure for 1966 was $570 Million. Since then AID has
tried to insure that its loans do not go simply to pay off debt3 of other
institutions and countries.
24. Two additional points may be considered in this debate, or;.e favoring
project and the other program lending. As project lending is typically
accompanied by recipients' commitments to put up part of project costs
from its own savings, and as the project will not advance if those funds
are not forthcoming, pressure will be maintained on the redpierit to keep
up its savings. Program loans, on the other hand, are given on the basis
of estimated current account deficits, which may be compatible with very
many aggregate consumption-inv estment mixes; the one in fact realized (and
its corresponding level of national savings) will only become known long
after the fact. Suppose that all projects undertaken in a given country
have the same foreign project lending element, which will be disbursed
only when the local share is put up. Then aid disbu::. .'.:'c::~~',t.s wiJ.l be
0

,,
I
I
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proporticna l to domestic savings, something which cannot be said for
program loans.

Countries with large external debt servicing, however, can run into
difficult administrat ive problems if gross aid inflows only come in
project form, with disbursemen ts subject to the vagaries of project imple•
mentation, while debt obligations have to be met regularly with free foreign
exchange (or "program repayments" ).
Counterpart finds generated by program lending were used, among many
other things, to try to promote sectorial reforms. But in the attempt
to achieve many targets with a single program loan, such efforts became
ineffectual , and it became obvious that priority was given to the anti
inflationary goals. PL-480 loans and grants would have been labelled
"sector loans" in that, at least in theory, they were given on conditions
that improvements were registered in Brazilian agricultura l production.
However, it is doubtful that they were used for that purpose. In fact,
they discouraged Brazilian corn exports, by debitting them against PL-480
wheat available to Brazil, ton for ton (Corn is a promising activity within
Brazilian agriculture ). They also tended to hamper agricultura l integration
between Brazil and Argentina, at a time when promotion of Latin American
integration became U.S. policy. PL-480 wheat flow, however, has declined
as a share of total Brazilian wheat imports, from about half during 1960-62
to 30 per cent during 1963-66.
25.

26. An AID sector loan to Chilean education has met with few difficultie s.
But given the interest of the Chilean government in education, this may
be a good example of the Hirschman-B ird point that program (or sector)
aid is fully effective only when it does not achieve anything, except
transferrin g resources.
Expressed as percentages of total value of loans signed, the
sectorial breakdown was as follows:
27.

IADB

Agriculture
Industry
Electricity
Transport
Housing
Education
Water, sewerage and health
Multisector and other
Data obtained from the CIAP Secretariat .
Trust Fund.

28.

AID

IBRD

12

14

15

20

4
51
21

85

?.4
5

5
6
21

3

8

7

IADB includes the Social Progress

Date from the IMF' s Internation al Financial Statistics.

29. See Albert o. Hirschman, "Industrial Development in the Brazilian Northeast
and the Tax Credit Scheme of Article 34/18", The Journal of Development Studies,
Volume 5, Number K, October 1968, pp. 5-29. Tue tax incentive scheme was
established by law in December 1961, and modified
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in June, 1963. Brazilian help to its own northeast is often given as
a reason by AID and the IBRD for the relatively few loans these institutions
have given to that part of the country. See New Directions for the 1970 1 s:
Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Development, op. cit., p. 586, comments
by Mr. William A. Bilis, of AID. Incidentally, the published versions
of these hearings on U.S. aid are liberally sprinkled with "Security
deletions". On the other hand, they provide some light reading, as in the
following interchange between Congressman Gross and Mr. Ellis (p. 585):

Mr. Gross.

Earlier, one of you spoke of the Constitution of Brazil.
That has been shredded a good many times, hasn't it?

Mr. Ellis.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Gross.

A constitution does not mean to them what it means to us
in this country?

Mr. Ellis.

The last constitution was that of 1967 and some of the basic
elements of that have been suspended.

Mr. Gross.

We get a lot of coffee from Brazil, do we not?

Mr. Ellis.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Gross.

We pay for it, do we not?

Mr. Ellis.

Yes, sir.

Charles P. Kindleberger, "Less Developed Countries and the
International Capi t~J. Market" (mimeographed).
30,

